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DISPELLING ALIMONY MYTHS: THE
CONTINUING NEED FOR ALIMONY AND THE
ALIMONY REFORM ACT OF 2011
RACHEL BISCARDI *
INTRODUCTION
Alimony has captured the public’s imagination over the past six
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years in Massachusetts as stories about the state’s “antiquated” alimony
laws proliferated in the media. 1 Grassroots organizations, primarily
comprised of alimony payors, mobilized to seek legislative solutions to
what they perceived as an outdated alimony system: a relic of a time
when women stayed home and cared for children while men were the
“breadwinners.” 2
The alimony reform movement gained momentum and, in 2009,
State Representative Steven M. Walsh introduced an alimony reform
bill, H. 1785, which had seventy-two sponsors. 3 Concurrently, State
Senator Cynthia Stone Creem filed S. 1616, a bill that also sought to
reform alimony policy in Massachusetts which garnered much support
from organizations such as the Boston Bar Association, Massachusetts
Bar Association, Women’s Bar Association, and the Academy of
Matrimonial Attorneys. 4 However, the two bills prompted a great deal
of media attention.5
On October 7, 2009, in order to review the pending bills and the
Commonwealth’s existing alimony statute, Massachusetts General Law
Chapter 208, section 34, the Chairs of the Legislature’s Joint Committee
on the Judiciary, Senator Creem and State Representative Eugene L.
O’Flaherty, initiated an Alimony Task Force (hereinafter “Task
Force”). 6 The Chairs of the Judiciary Committee appointed State
Senator Gale D. Candaras and State Representative John V. Fernandes to
The Co-Chairs were joined by
Co-Chair the Task Force. 7
representatives from the Commonwealth’s judiciary branch,
representatives from local bar associations, practicing attorneys, and a
representative from the Massachusetts Alimony Reform advocacy group

1. See Renee Mahoney, Changes to Current Alimony Law, http://ezinearticles.com/?Ch
anges-to-Current-Alimony-Law&id=6133721 (last visited Feb. 14, 2014) (discussing the
focus that media had on alimony reform and the need for change of antiquated alimony laws);
see also Jessica Fargen, Reform Could End Alimony For Life, BOSTONHERALD.COM (Jan. 30,
2011), http://bostonherald.com/news/regional/view/20110130pols_crusaders_band_togethe
r_to_support_radical_bill.
2. “It is obvious that times have changed so drastically that Alimony is truly draconian
law that has served out it’s [sic] purpose.” Changing the System, ALIMONY REFORM, http://w
ww.alimonyreform.org/about2.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2014).
3. H. 1785, 186th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2009). See also Lisa van der Pool, Dueling Alimony
Bills Raise Hackles in Legal Circles, BOSTON BUS. J. (Oct. 5, 2009, 12:00 AM) http://www.b
izjournals.com/boston/stories/2009/10/05/story7.html?page=all.
4. S. 1616, 186th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2009). See also van der Pool, supra note 3.
5. See Mahoney, supra note 1.
6. Denise Squillante, Filing of the Alimony Reform Act of 2011, LAW. J. (Feb. 2011),
http://www.massbar.org/publications/lawyers-journal/2011/february/filing-of-the-alimonyreform-act-of-2011.
7. Id.
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responsible for drafting H. 1785. 8
As the Women’s Bar Association of Massachusetts’s representative
to the Task Force, I worked with the other members for fourteen months
drafting proposed legislation to reform alimony. The members of the
Task Force held diverse opinions on alimony based on individual
experience and background, as well as their respective organizational
missions. 9 The Task Force submitted its final product, a bill entitled the
Alimony Reform Act of 2011, to the Judiciary Committee for
consideration, and on July 20, 2011, the Judiciary Committee advanced
the bill with a favorable report.10 By July 28, 2011, the Senate and the
House had unanimously approved the bill. 11 Governor Deval Patrick
signed the bill (hereinafter “Alimony Reform Act” or “Act”) on
September 26, 2011 and it became law on March 1, 2012. 12
One group particularly pleased with the Alimony Reform Act’s
passage was the “Second Wives Club,” comprised of second wives of
alimony payors. 13 The Second Wives Club contends that the prior
alimony system required second wives to utilize their income to support
their spouse’s former wives. 14 Many of these second wives believe that

8. Members of the task force included Senator Gale D. Candaras (Co-Chair);
Representative John V. Fernandes (Co-Chair); the Honorable Paula M. Carey, Chief Justice of
the Probate and Family Court; Kelly Leighton, Esq., Liaison to the Boston Bar Association;
Fern L. Frolin, Esq., Massachusetts Chapter of the American Academy of Matrimonial
Lawyers; David Lee, Esq., Massachusetts Chapter of the American Academy of Matrimonial
Lawyers; Denise Squillante, Esq., Massachusetts Bar Association; Steve Hitner,
Massachusetts Alimony Reform; Rachel Biscardi, Esq., Women’s Bar Association.
9. See Jeanette DeForge, State Sen. Gale Candaras of Wilbraham to Announce
Proposal to Change Massachusetts Alimony Law, THE REPUBLICAN (May 17, 2011, 9:43
PM), http://www.masslive.com/news/index.ssf/2011/05/state_sen_gale_candaras_to_ann.html
(acknowledging that members of the Task Force will come from diverse backgrounds
including legislators, practicing attorneys, and representatives from local bar associations).
10. House Unanimously Passes Alimony Reform Legislation, WICKEDLOCAL (July 23,
2011, 11:01 PM) http://www.wickedlocal.com/capecod/news/x920807747/House-unanimou
sly-passes-alimony-reform-legislation#axzz255AvUDwf.
11. Martine Powers, Legislation Overhauls Bay State Alimony Law, BOSTON.COM
(Sept. 26, 2011), http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2011/09/26/legis
lation_overhauls_bay_state_alimony_law/; Nancy Van Time, What Massachusetts Alimony
Really Means, HUFFINGTON POST: THE BLOG (July 27, 2011 1:06 PM), http://www.huffingto
npost.com/nancy-van-tine/what-massachusetts-alimony-reform-means_b_909252.html; 2011
Massachusetts Bill Tracking H.B. 3617 (Westlaw).
12. Susanna Kim, Massachusetts Alimony Law Limits Payments to Ex-Spouses, ABC
NEWS (Sept. 27, 2011, 8:22 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/business/2011/09/massachus
etts-alimony-law-limits-payments-to-ex-spouses/.
13. SECOND WIVES CLUB, http://www.secondwivesclub.com (last visited Feb. 14,
2014).
14. Id. Despite the Second Wives Club’s allegation that second wives’ incomes
contribute to their current husbands’ alimony payments to his first spouse, case law on
alimony does not support the Second Wives Club’s allegation. When a court calculates
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alimony recipients, who are primarily women, should advance feminism
by being self-supporting without the assistance of a male, former
spouse. 15
Groups, such as the Second Wives Club, are entirely correct that
alimony is a feminist issue. Despite the gains made over the past fifty
years, the paradigm of men paying alimony and women receiving
alimony remains true even today. 16 Like many other women’s issues,
such as reproductive rights and health care, alimony is divisive. 17
However, it is misguided to argue that feminism demands the
abolishment of alimony as an available remedy during a divorce, to
enable women to become self-sustaining. Feminism demands equal
rights for men and women. 18 Feminism also recognizes that women
often must choose between focusing on their families and pursuing their
careers. 19 Each of those choices is equally valid; a woman’s choice to
focus on family should not negate her feminism. 20 Instead, feminism
alimony, the court will only use the alimony payor’s income and expenses to determine the
proper amount of monthly alimony. Although the second spouse’s income may contribute to
the alimony payor deducting fewer expenses from his income, the court does not directly
include the second spouse’s income in a calculation for the first spouse’s alimony award. See
Krokyn v. Krokyn, 390 N.E.2d 733, 738 (Mass. 1979) (holding that a second wife does not
have a duty to obey an alimony order granted against her spouse). But see Cooper v. Cooper,
680 N.E.2d 1173, 1177 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997) (holding that a probate court does have the
power to consider the income or assets of a second spouse when calculating alimony
payments).
15. See Judy Klemesrud, Feminist-Oriented Group Attacks ‘Alimony Junkies’, OCALA
STAR-BANNER, July 13, 1970, at 6A, available at news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1356&d
at=19700713&id=9YJRAAAAIBAJ&sjid=SAUEAAAAIBAJ&pg=6933,1954225
(acknowledging that Manhattan’s The Other Women, Ltd. believes that alimony reinforces
male supremacy and is degrading). Statistics show that less than four percent of alimony
payors are women. Anna Jane Grossman, Some ex-wives have to pay ‘manimony’, CNN.COM
(May 22, 2008), http://www.cnn.com/2008/LIVING/personal/05/22/lw.manimony/. Women
are the primary recipients of alimony. See Brief for Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at
12, Pierce v. Pierce, 916 N.E.2d 330 (Mass. 2009) (SJC NO. SJC-10381) (citing Kathleen M.
O’Connor, Note, Marital Property Reform in Massachusetts: A Choice for the New
Millenium, 34 NEW ENG. L. REV. 261, 265 (1999)).
16. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
17. See Robert Klotz & Anna Broome, Discussion of Women’s Issues in the 1996
Internet Campaign, 19:4 WOMEN & POL. 67, 71-72 (1998).
18. Feminism and Women’s Rights, The Cato Institute 173, 174. Gloria Steinem, a
noted feminist, supported “broad, uncomplicated ideas of universality.” Jill M. Weber, Gloria
Steinem, Testimony Before Senate Hearings on the Equal Rights Amendment, 3 VOICES OF
DEMOCRACY 162, 165 (2008).
19. Feminism does not require that women be able to “have it all,” but rather only
requires that women have the right to make choices. Stephanie Coontz, Why is ‘having it all’
just a woman’s issue?, CNN.COM (June 25, 2012 9:10 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/25
/opinion/coontz-women-have-it-all/index.html; Samantha Smith, In Women’s Voices, in
FEMINISM AND WOMEN’S RIGHT’S WORLDWIDE, VOLUME I: HERITAGE ROLES AND ISSUES,
64 (Michelle A. Paludi ed., 2010).
20. See sources cited supra note 19.
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recognizes that in some cases alimony is necessary to ensure that one
spouse does not benefit to the other’s detriment, especially when family
choices regarding childcare and housework have polarizing economic
effects on each spouse upon divorce and there is minimal property to
divide. 21 Therefore, rather than advocating for alimony elimination,
feminists should support gender parity between recipients and payors.
In short, “[a]s women must be more empowered at work, men must be
more empowered at home.” 22
Since Massachusetts passed the Alimony Reform Act, judges,
lawyers, the media, and the public have engaged in an ongoing discourse
about the “winners” and “losers” under the new law.23 People
misperceive that since mostly male alimony payors benefited from
reform, alimony recipients, mostly women, must commensurately
suffer. 24 This is not the case: while the Act disadvantages some women,
(most likely those women who divorced after long-term marriages with
alimony agreements that the courts can modify), 25 alimony reform
assists the vast majority of women. 26 In fact, many of the women who
stand to benefit from the Alimony Reform Act were not eligible for
alimony under the previous law. 27 The first half of this Article focuses
on why alimony recipients continue to need alimony despite the
economic gains made by women in the past fifty years. The second half
of the Article dispels the myth that women were the “losers” in alimony
reform 28 by explaining how the Alimony Reform Act benefits the
21. Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 49-50 (1989) (citing
the optimal division of marital tasks that oftentimes results in varied financial consequences
for men and women post-divorce as one justification behind alimony law).
22. SHERYL SANDBERG WITH NELL SCOVELL, LEAN IN: WOMEN, WORK, AND THE
WILL TO LEAD 108 (Alfred A. Knopf 2013).
23. See, e.g., Galen Moore, Alimony reform becomes law in Massachusetts, BOS. BUS.
J. (Sept. 27, 2011, 7:41 AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/boston/news/2011/09/27/alimonyreform-signed-into-law-in-mass.html (discussing the “winners” under the new law); Wendy
Murphy, New alimony law is bad for women, CNN.COM (Mar. 9, 2012, 12:35 PM),
www.cnn.com/2012/03/09/opinion/murphy-alimony-overhaul-con/index.html.
24. Murphy, supra note 23.
25. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 49 (2011); The Real Losers in Alimony Reform:
Stay at Home Spouses in Long Term Marriages. Is There Any Wiggle Room?, Rosenberg,
GOLDSTEIN, EGLOFF, RAMOS & WOOD LLP (Jan. 9, 2012), www.massachusetts-divorce.com/
blog/?p=44; Murphy, supra note 23.
26. See Part II, infra.
27. See generally Part II, infra; The Divorce Lawyers, New Massachusetts Alimony Law
Makes Divorce Less of a Gamble, THE MASS. FAM. L. GROUP (July 24, 2012),
http://www.thebostondivorcelawyer.com/Divorce-Articles/New-Massachusetts-AlimonyLaw-Makes-Divorce-Less-of-a-Gamble.shtml (acknowledging that the formula for limits on
duration of alimony following a short term marriage may benefit spouses who are leaving
short term marriages).
28. Murphy, supra note 23.
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majority of alimony recipients. 29 This article does not intend to be a
thorough review of the new law but rather a survey of the most notable
provisions affecting alimony recipients.
I.

THE CONTINUING NEED FOR ALIMONY

Since 1785, courts have employed alimony as an equitable remedy
in divorce cases, 30 recognizing that during an intact marriage, spouses
jointly decide how to divide responsibility for childrearing, household
maintenance, and paid work. 31 Alimony theory posits that it would be
inequitable for these joint decisions to benefit one party while
simultaneously disadvantaging the other party upon divorce.32 This
section identifies some, but not all, of the factors that make alimony an
equitable remedy in a divorce, including: (a) the stay at home spouse’s
professional sacrifices; (b) the wage gap; (c) the glass ceiling; and (d)
marketable skills post-divorce. This section further dispels two of the
more common arguments made by alimony opponents including: (1) that
equitable division of assets should suffice to mitigate the need for
alimony and (2) that public benefits serve as a safety net, also mitigating
the need for alimony. Finally, this section focuses on why alimony may
be the only relief available to women who have sacrificed career for
family.
A. Women’s Standard of Living Declines Precipitously After Divorce
Women fare worse financially than men after a divorce. 33 In 2009,
the United States Census determined that nearly twice the amount of
divorced women than divorced men had incomes in the past twelve
months below the poverty level. 34 Overall, divorced women suffer, on

29. See The Divorce Lawyers, supra note 27.
30. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 34 (2011) (noted in the annotations section that
the first version of the alimony statute was passed in 1785). The Alimony Reform Act does
not change the alimony order paradigm; there remain the dual requirements of a recipient’s
need and payor’s ability to pay. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 53 (2011).
31. Ellman, supra note 21, at 49-50.
32. Id.
33. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MARITAL EVENTS OF AMERICANS: 2009, 1, 8 tbl.2 (Aug.
2011); see Jennifer L. McCoy, Spousal Support Disorder: An Overview of Problems in
Current Alimony Law, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 501, 516 n.126 (2005); see generally Tijdens,
K.G., Van Klaveren, M., Frozen In Time, gender pay gap unchanged for 10 years, INT’L
TRADE UNION CONFEDERATION (Mar. 2012), http://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/pay_gap_en_
final.pdf; Brief for Amicus Curiae, supra note 5, at 13 (citing Robert M. Gordon, Note, The
Limits of Limits on Divorce, 107 YALE L.J. 1435, 1440 n.39 (1998)); Penelope E. Bryan,
Reasking the Woman Question at Divorce, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 713, 713-15 (2000)
[hereinafter “Bryan 2000”].
34. MARITAL EVENTS OF AMERICANS, supra note 33.
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average, a twenty-seven percent decrease in their marital standard of
living in contrast to men whose standard of living increases, on average,
ten percent. 35 The post-divorce financial situation for mothers is even
more devastating; thirty-seven percent of divorced women with children
live in poverty. 36
Like their counterparts across the country, Massachusetts women
also suffer financially after a divorce, and, without alimony, their
income is extremely low. 37
Sixty percent of Massachusetts alimony recipients report annual
incomes exclusive of alimony of less than $50,000, with three out of
four of those reporting incomes of less than $25,000 per year
exclusive of alimony. For these recipients, the average amount of
alimony received constitutes one-quarter to one-third or more of
their total income. High-income alimony recipients represent only a
minority of those who receive alimony payments. Only thirteen
percent of alimony recipients have reported incomes exclusive of
38
alimony in excess of $100,000 per year.

These statistics demonstrate that, most often, alimony recipients are
not becoming wealthy due to alimony but are, instead, maintaining a
middle or lower-income lifestyle. Without alimony, these recipients
may fall into poverty.
1. Women Sacrifice Their Professional Development for Their
Families
Women comprise the vast majority of alimony recipients, in part,
because they, more frequently than men, sacrifice professional goals in
order to focus on the family. 39 Sometimes married women give up
35. Richard R. Peterson, A Re-Evaluation of the Economic Consequences of Divorce,
61 AM. SOC. REV. 528, 532 (June 1996).
36. Sarah G. Vincent, Kurz’s ‘For Richer, For Poorer’ Confronts Inequalities of
Divorce, THE HARVARD CRIMSON, (Nov. 9, 1995), http://www.thecrimson.com/article/1995/1
1/9/kurzs-for-richer-for-poorer-confronts/.
37. Brief for Amicus Curiae, supra note 15, at 7 (citing reported adjusted gross incomes
and alimony payments on Massachusetts tax returns filed for calendar year 2007).
38. Id.
39. See Women in the Workforce, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/newsr
oom/pdf/women_workforce_slides.pdf (percentage of men working full-time is greater than
the percentage of women working full-time); Robert L. Lerman, Economic Perspectives on
Marriage: Causes, Consequences, and Public Policy, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE
ECONOMICS OF FAMILY LAW 72, 86 (Lloyd R. Cohen & Joshua D. Wright eds., 2011) (citing
Shannon Seitz, Employment and the Marriage Market, (2000) (unpublished Ph.D Dissertation,
London, ON: University of Western Ontario) (on file with author) (married women work less
than unmarried women)); UNITED NATIONS DEP’T OF SOC. & ECON. AFFAIRS, UNITED
NATIONS, THE WORLD’S WOMEN 2010, 1, 212, tbl.4c (2010), http://unstats.un.org/unsd/
demographic/products/Worldswomen/WW_full%20report_BW.pdf (women spent more time
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working altogether. Although recent statistics show that workforce
participation among married women is increasing, roughly 3 out of 10
married mothers remain unemployed. 40
Married women still shoulder the additional burdens of childrearing and housework. “[W]hen a husband and wife both are employed
full-time, the mother does 40 percent more child care and about 30
percent more housework than the father.” 41 Due to this disproportionate
responsibility for childrearing and household maintenance,42 employed
married women may restrict their work hours, find work close to home,
give up opportunities for advancement, and suffer decreased earnings.43
Ironically, the more hours their husbands work, the more likely married
wives are to leave the workforce. 44 When husbands work fifty or more
hours per week, wives with children are 44% more likely to quit their
jobs than wives with children whose husbands work less. 45 Women will
spend on average 11.5 years out of the workforce and will lose more
than $659,000 in wages, Social Security, and pension contributions.46
When women take time out of the workforce, they lose
opportunities for career training, promotions, and reward-based
assignments. 47 Only 40% of those women who take time out of the
workplace will return to full-time jobs. 48 As a result, for each year that
on unpaid work than men); Division of Labor, MARRIAGE AND FAMILY ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://family.jrank.org/pages/408/Division-Labor-Contemporary-Divisions-Labor.html (last
visited Feb. 14, 2014) (“Household work continues to be divided according to gender, with
women performing the vast majority of the repetitive indoor housework tasks and men
performing occasional outdoor tasks.”) (citing Scott Coltrane, Research on Household Labor:
Modeling and Measuring the Social Embeddedness of Routine Family Work, 62 J. MARRIAGE
& FAM. 1208, 1208-33 (2000)).
40. ROSE M. KREIDER & DIANA B. ELLIOT, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU Historical Changes
in Stay-at-Home Mothers: 1969-2009, slide 10 (Aug. 2010). The percentage of employed
married women is still less than the percentage of employed unmarried women. Lerman,
supra note 39.
41. See Sandberg, supra note 22, at 106 (citing Melissa A. Milkie, Sara B. Raley &
Suzanne M. Bianchi, Taking on the Second Shift: Time Allocations and Time Pressures of
U.S. Parents with Preschoolers, 88 SOCIAL FORCES 487, 487-517 (2009)).
42. See Division of Labor, supra note 39. In 2010, women over the age of fifteen spent
about four hours and nine minutes a week on unpaid work and men only spent two hours and
forty minutes a week on unpaid work. THE WORLD’S WOMEN, supra note 39, at 212 tbl.4c.
43. Sandberg, supra note 22, at 98-99 (citation omitted).
44. Sandberg, supra note 22, at 99 (citing Youngjoo Cha, Reinforcing Separate
Spheres: The Effect of Spousal Overwork on Men’s and Women’s Employment in DualEarner Households, 75 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW 303, 318 (2010)).
45. Id.
46. Brief for Amicus Curiae, supra note 15, at 17-18.
47. Id.
48. Sandberg, supra note 22, 102 (citing Sylvia Ann Hewlett & Carolyn Buck Luce,
Off-Ramps and On-Ramps: Keeping Talented Women on the Road to Success, 83 HARVARD
BUSINESS REVIEW 43, 46 (2005)).
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women do not work, they must work an additional five years to recover
the lost economic opportunities of that one year.49 Even if women do
work during a marriage, they are often forced to choose less demanding
jobs with flexible hours. 50 As a result of making such professional
sacrifices, “fifty-six percent of working women earned less than $30,000
yearly and only seven percent of working women earned more than
$75,000.” 51 Beyond low pay, women’s jobs may not provide them
benefits, such as healthcare and managed retirement plans.52 Thus,
employed married women rarely maintain the momentum in their
careers that their husbands can.53
2. The Wage Gap Prevents Many Women from Being on Equal
Footing with Their Husbands
Married women’s sacrifice of professional goals is often an
unfortunately logical choice: women still earn significantly less than
men even in comparable jobs and they are more frequently passed over
for promotions. 54 In the workforce, women on average earn less than
similarly positioned men. 55 In 2009, women earned 77 cents to every
dollar earned by a comparable male in a full-time year round position. 56
Employers may even be more hesitant to hire mothers rather than fathers
because of societal expectations that mothers will restrict their working
hours. 57 In fact, mothers returning to work after an absence have an
even higher wage gap than other women, but fatherhood does not reduce
earnings for men. 58 Employers are twice as likely to interview childless
49. Brief for Amicus Curiae, supra note 15, at 17.
50. Id.
51. Id. (citing Cindy Hounsell, Why Women are Poor in Retirement, 43
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 161, 162 (2009)).
52. Brief for Amicus Curiae, supra note 15, at 17.
53. See Hounsell, supra note 51.
54. See generally Frozen In Time, supra note 33 (highlighting the remaining pay gap
between men and women); Jerry A. Jacobs, Detours on the Road to Equality: Women, Work
and Higher Education, 2:1 CONTEXTS 32, 32 (2003) (women are increasingly earning college
degrees, but are entering traditionally male occupations at a slower rate); Correll, Bernard, In
Paik, Getting a Job: Is There a Motherhood Penalty?, 112:5 AM. J. SOC. 1297-1338 (March
2007) (mothers are less likely to be hired than childless women); Julie A. Winkler, Faculty
Reappointment, Tenure, and Promotion: Barriers for Women, 52:4 THE PROFESSIONAL
GEOGRAPHER737, 737-48 (2000) (female university faculty are less likely to be promoted
than male faculty); Alice H. Eagly & Linda L. Carli, Women and the Labyrinth of Leadership,
HARV. BUS. REV. (2007), available at http://citt.hccfl.edu/Newsletters/NewsletterID1.pdf
(showing that even when women have equal qualifications as men, women are less likely to
be promoted).
55. See Frozen In Time, supra note 33.
56. See Women in the Workforce, supra note 39, at 4.
57. See id. (illustrating that women work, on average, less than their male counterparts).
58. See Amanda K. Baumle, The Cost of Parenthood: Unraveling the Effects of Sexual
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women as they are to interview mothers.59
Although alimony opponents argue that pay disparity between men
and women is disappearing, the decrease in pay gap is not consistent,
and in 2010, the pay disparity between men and women actually
increased. 60 Even more shockingly, despite the narrowing of the gender
pay gap, the Institute for Women’s Policy Research’s recent study found
that if the gender wage gap continues to close at the current rate, the
wage gap between men and women would not disappear until 2056.61
Therefore, despite women advancing in education and participation in
the workforce, there still is a continuing and significant pay discrepancy
between genders. 62 Even when women are working during a marriage,
they may remain financially dependent on their husbands because they
cannot earn maximum income.
3. The Glass Ceiling Bars Women from High-Powered Positions
In addition to the gender pay gap, the unlikelihood of women
holding high-paying positions of power, such as a corporate officer, may
still leave women financially dependent on their husbands.63 In 2005,
there were only seven female CEOs at the nation’s Fortune 500
companies. 64 A survey by Catalyst, a non-profit women’s interest
group, polled Fortune 500 companies to determine the number and

Orientation and Gender on Income, 90:4 SOC. SCI. Q. 983, 986 (2009).
59. Id.
60. Labor Force, Employment, and Earnings, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, tbl.648 (2012).
See also THE WORLD’S WOMEN 2010, supra note 39, at 96. The U.S. Census Bureau
gathered statistics and reported that the disparity in median earnings of full-time workers only
decreased by $3,000 between the years 1960 and 2009. Furthermore, in 2009, the pay
disparity between full-time employees based on gender was $10,800 per year. Women in the
Workforce, supra note 39.
61. INST. FOR WOMEN’S POL’Y RESEARCH, WOMEN’S MEDIAN EARNINGS AS A
PERCENT OF MEN’S MEDIAN EARNINGS, 1969-2009 (FULL-TIME, YEAR-ROUND WORKERS)
WITH PROJECTION FOR PAY EQUITY IN 2056 (Mar. 2011), based on DeNavas-Walt et al., U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States:
2009, tbl.A-4 (2010).
62. Sarah Jane Glynn, Fact Sheet: The Wage Gap for Women, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS, (Aug. 16, 2012) http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/labor/news/2012/08/16
/12029/fact-sheet-the-wage-gap-for-women/ (acknowledging that about half of all workers in
the U.S. are women, but that there is still a wage gap amongst men and women such that
women who work full time earn only seventy-seven percent of what men earn).
63. RAYMOND F. GREGORY, WOMEN AND WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION:
OVERCOMING BARRIERS TO GENDER EQUALITY 2 (Rutgers University Press ed., 2003).
64. Bonnie Williamson, New Trends in Employment, STATEUNIVERSITY.COM, http://
careers.stateuniversity.com/pages/856/New-Trends-in-Employment-Women-MinoritiesImmigrants-Older-Employees-Physically-Challenged.html#ixzz24zIXkc00 (last visited Feb.
14, 2014).
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gender of people seated on their boards of directors. 65 While the
percentage of female corporate officers at Fortune 500 companies had
risen to 15.7 percent in 2002, up from 12.5 percent in 2000,66 those
numbers need to increase a great deal before there is gender parity at
these companies. Catalyst’s research predicts that by 2020, women will
outnumber men in the workforce but men will still hold nearly 75
percent of board of directors positions in Fortune 500 companies.67 In
fact, in 2012, only 4.2 percent of the Fortune 500 CEOs were women
and seventeen percent of the board seats on those companies were held
by women. 68
Measuring women-owned businesses provides another way to
assess the glass ceiling in smaller enterprises.
Women-owned
businesses comprise only 28 percent of all businesses nationally. 69 In
Massachusetts, the percentage of women-owned businesses is only
slightly higher as compared to the nationwide percentage, at 29
percent. 70 Business ownership statistics matter because business owners
have more power to influence the operation of business, in general, in
the marketplace. 71 In fact, “the best way to reform an institution is to
run it.” 72 These statistics also demonstrate, because the numbers of
women-owned businesses are so low, that it is likely women will not
influence the growth of existing smaller businesses and develop
entrepreneurial skills on par with men.
For women who have not obtained a high level of education, glassceiling statistics are even grimmer. It is much less likely that these
women ever work in positions of power or be employed at all. 73 “52
percent of mothers with husbands in the bottom quarter” of the earning
scale dropped out of the workforce.74 Likely, the escalating costs of

65. Id.
66. Williamson, supra, note 64.
67. Id.
68. Patricia Sellers, Fortune 500 Women CEOs Hit a Milestone, CNN/MONEY (Nov.
12, 2012), http://postcards.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2012/11/12/fortune-500-women-ceos-3/.
69. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, SURVEY OF BUSINESS OWNERS: 2007; TABLE 2. SUMMARY
STATISTICS FOR WOMEN-OWNED FIRMS BY STATE (Dec. 7, 2010).
70. Id.
71. Rajeswararao Chaganti & Fariborz Damanpour, Institutional Ownership, Capital
Structure, and Firm Performance, 12 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 479, 480 (1991).
72. Jenifer B. McKim, In Boston, Facebook’s Sheryl Sandberg pitches her ‘Lean In’
message to an enthusiastic audience, BOSTON.COM, http://www.boston.com/businessupdates/
2013/04/04/boston-facebook-sheryl-sandberg-pitches-her-lean-message-enthusiasticaudience/e7Ee1a5B2Y1JjnEEVodYyI/story.html (last visited February 2, 2014).
73. See Paula England, et al., Women’s Employment, Education and the Gender Gap in
17 Countries, MONTHLY LAB. REV. 6, Chart 1 (2012).
74. See Sandberg, supra note 22, at 99.
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child care contributed to the family’s decision that the mother should
stay at home as “child care costs have risen twice as fast as the median
income of families with children.” 75
In fact, one recent study indicated that only 30 percent of women
who have lower levels of education, defined as those who have not
completed a vocational education or postsecondary education, are
employed. 76 Even if employed, a large number of women with lower
levels of education only work part-time or as minimum wage
employees. 77
4. Post-Divorce Women May Not Have the Desirable Marketable
Skills to Compete in a Challenging Marketplace
Women lose 1.5 percent of income upon reentering the workforce
for each year they are out, as compared to women who have consistently
worked. 78 Women who primarily worked in the home during a marriage
struggle to find higher paying jobs because they have fewer marketable
skills and lack employment experience.79 It is not as easy as simply
getting a job at Walmart. 80 Moreover, tuition costs for additional
schooling and child care costs can be prohibitive. 81 The lack of
desirable, marketable skills is even more difficult for lower-income
75. Id.
76. England, supra note 73.
77. See Tula Connell, Most Minimum Wage Earners Are Women, AFL-CIO (June 21,
2012),
http://www.aflcio.org/Blog/Economy/Most-Minimum-Wage-Earners-Are-Women
(lamenting that 62 percent of minimum wage workers in 2011 were women); PEW RESEARCH
CENTER, WOMEN, WORK AND MOTHERHOOD: A SAMPLER OF RECENT PEW RESEARCH
SURVEY FINDINGS (Apr. 13, 2012), http://pewresearch.org/pubs/2241/ann-romney-mommywars-hilary-rosen-working-women-stay-at-home-moms-ann-romney (acknowledging that,
based on a 2009 study, 26 percent of employed women only work part-time); THE WORLD’S
WOMEN 2010, supra note 39, at 93-95.
78. Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory of Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J.
2227, 2282-83 (1994).
79. See McCoy, supra note 33, at 517, (citing Vivian Hamilton, Mistaking Marriage for
Social Policy, 11 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 307, 362 (2004)); Penelope E. Bryan, Women’s
Freedom to Contract at Divorce: A Mask for Contextual Coercion, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1153,
n.2 (1999) [hereinafter “Bryan 1999”]; Pamela J. Smock, Gender and the Short-Run
Economic Consequences of Marital Disruption, 73:1 SOC. FORCES 243, 245 (1994). One
such woman posted about her situation online, stating that she was a stay-at-home mom
during her marriage and now, post-divorce, her only skill is typing, which has prevented her
from finding work. Divorced Mom’s Finances, THE DOLLAR STRETCHER, INC.,
www.stretcher.com/stories/04/04jun14a.cfm (last visited Feb. 2, 2014).
80. Some Walmart stores require a career assessment test to determine a job candidate’s
suitability for employment. See WALMART, https://hiringcenter.walmartstores.com/Online
HiringCenter/initialPage.jsp (last visited February 2, 2014); see also Bent Jesper Christensen,
et al., On-the-Job Search and the Wage Distribution, 23:1J. LAB. ECON. 31, 46 (2005)
(“[H]igher paying jobs are more difficult to find.”).
81. McCoy, supra note 33, at 517.
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women who are even less likely to afford the education or training
necessary to obtain higher paying jobs. 82
B. Disputing Alimony Opponents’ Arguments
1. An Equitable Division of Assets Does Not Mitigate the Need for
Alimony
Alimony opponents argue that alimony is unnecessary because an
equitable division of assets should provide financial sustainability for
both parties. 83 However, this argument presupposes that there are assets
to divide upon divorce. Many low-income families do not acquire assets
during the marriage. 84 Rather, low-income families frequently live
paycheck to paycheck. 85 Even if spouses have some accumulated
money, it is generally in the form of income streams and not divisible
assets. 86 Thus, only alimony, derived from the income stream of the
payor, will offset the lack of assets to divide and ameliorate the postdivorce financial instability that recipients are likely to experience.87
Furthermore, even if a couple had some liquid assets, “no matter how
pensions and savings and investments are sliced and diced . . . [they] do
not provide adequate retirement income.” 88
Even if a couple had substantial marital property, women frequently
lack legal representation and therefore end up receiving fewer assets
than men receive in a divorce decree.89 Legal representation in divorce
cases confers drastic benefits upon a litigant because self-represented
82. Bryan 1999, supra note 79, at 1165-66.
83. A husband may have no obligation to pay alimony, in part because the couple may
have had marital property to divide upon divorce. Akbarieh v. Akbarieh, No. 10-P-1411,
2012 WL 360480 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012). See also UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT §308,
9A U.L.A. 446 (1973) (“Only if the available property is insufficient for the purpose and if the
spouse who seeks maintenance is unable to secure employment appropriate to his skills and
interests or is occupied with childcare may an award of maintenance be ordered.”).
84. See LAWRENCE GANONG ET AL., UNIV. OF MO. DEP’T OF HUMAN DEV. AND
FAMILY STUDIES, FINANCIAL CONCERNS OF LOW-INCOME FAMILIES 2, citing CATHERINE P.
MONTALTO, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., NAT’L CREDIT UNION FOUND., WEALTH-POOR
HOUSEHOLDS IN THE UNITED STATES(2002); Williams, supra note 43, at 2232; McCoy, supra
note 33, at 502 (citing Marsha Garrison, The Economic Consequences of Divorce: Would
Adoption of the ALI Principles Improve Current Outcomes?, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y
119, 126, 128 (2001)).
85. See generally A Woman’s Nation Pushes Back From the Brink, SHRIVER REPORT,
http://shriverreport.org/special-report/a-womans-nation-pushes-back-from-the-brink/
(last
visited Feb. 16, 2014).
86. Williams, supra note 78, at 2251 (citing, John H. Langbein, The Twentieth Century
Revolution on Family Wealth Transmission, 86 MICH. L. REV. 722, 725 (1988)).
87. Williams, supra note 78, at 2251-52.
88. Hounsell, supra note 51, at 168.
89. Bryan 2000, supra note 33, at 714-18.
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litigants do not have training or preparation to confront the complex
requirements, processes, and events involved in the court system. 90
Despite this, the legal system must hold self-represented litigants to the
The legal system’s complexity
same standards as lawyers. 91
disadvantages self-represented litigants who often do not know to
provide the proper information that judges need to make a final
determination.92
2. Public Benefits Do Not Provide a Sufficient Safety Net to
Mitigate the Need for Alimony
Alimony opponents also argue that public benefits can provide the
safety net for women who might otherwise fall into poverty without
alimony. 93 Public benefits do not suffice as a substitution for alimony. 94
Over the last decade, the number of low-income parents eligible for
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and for the Food
Stamps Programs (FSP) (now known as the Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP)) has decreased. 95 For every 100 families
that fall under the poverty guidelines, only 27 families are receiving cash
assistance from TANF. 96 This may be for many reasons including that
many low-income women lack the knowledge and resources to apply for
public benefits. 97
Even if they meet the poverty guidelines and do apply, the number
of unemployed women denied welfare has grown substantially in the
past ten years. 98 Approximately 20 to 25 percent of all unemployed low-

90. Brenda Star Adams, “Unbundled Legal Services”: A Solution to the Problems
Caused by Pro Se Litigation in Massachusetts Civil Courts, 40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 303, 309
n.45 (2005).
91. Carolyn D. Schwartz, Note, Pro Se Divorce Litigants: Frustrating the Original Role
of the Trial Court Judge and Court Personnel, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 655, 655 (2004). See Leslie
Feitz, Comment, Pro Se Litigants in Domestic Relations Cases, 14:22J. AM. ACAD.
MATRIMONIAL L. 193, 195-96 (2008) (“Without some knowledge and assistance along the
way, the unrepresented party has no chance of ‘living up to the standard set for attorneys.’”).
92. Feitz, supra note 9191.
93. See Kathryn J. Edin, The Myths of Dependency and Self Sufficiency: Work, Welfare,
and Low Wage Work, 17:2 WIS. U. INST. FOR RES. ON POVERTY, 1-9 (1995).
94. Id. (public benefits alone do not provide a sufficient living for low-income women).
95. The National Association of Child Care Resource and Referral Agencies,
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families and Children in Poverty, http://www.naccrra.org/s
ites/default/files/default_site_pages/2012/tanfandpoverty2012.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2014).
96. Danilo Trisi & LaDonna Pavetti, TANF Weakening as a Safety Net for Poor
Families, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, (Mar. 13, 2012) http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?
fa=view&id=3700.
97. See Ganong, supra note 84, at 3.
98. Rebecca M. Blank, Improving the Safety Net for Single Mothers Who Face Serious
Barriers to Work, 17 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 183, 183 (2007).
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income single mothers cannot meet the welfare work requirement, due to
an impaired ability to work, and thus are ineligible for welfare.99
Unfortunately, the impairment that causes them to be unable to work
may not meet Supplemental Security Income (SSI) standards for
eligibility, which requires that applicants have a medical disability that
will last at least twelve months preventing the recipient from engaging in
“substantial gainful activity.” 100 Finally, low-income women deemed
ineligible for TANF and SSI are further disadvantaged economically
because they are less likely to receive food stamps and Medicaid. 101
When women cannot receive food stamps or Medicaid, their postdivorce financial situation becomes more unstable, given the vast
assistance that public benefits provide to a low-income family. 102
C.

Alimony Benefits Women

The benefits of receiving alimony are substantial and provide a way
for women to improve their precarious post-divorce financial
positions. 103 For low-income women in Massachusetts, alimony
payments constitute, on average, one-quarter to one-third or more of
their total income. 104 For example, with alimony, low-income women
may be able to provide necessities such as food and shelter.105 In
contrast, without alimony, if these women are ineligible for public
housing, for example, or forced to rely on family support, they could end
up in homeless shelters with their children if they could even qualify for
the Emergency Assistance Program. 106 For many low-income women,
alimony allows them to remain self-sustaining.
When low-income women receive alimony, their quality of life

99. ANU RANGARAJAN, LAURA CASTNER, & MELISSA A. CLARK, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PUBLIC ASSISTANCE USE AMONG TWO-PARENT FAMILIES: AN
ANALYSIS OF TANF AND FOOD STAMP PROGRAM ELIGIBILITY AND PARTICIPATION XVI,
fig.1 Families (Jan. 2005), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/05/2parent-part/report.pdf.
100. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A) (2006).
101. Blank, supra note 9898, at 190, (citing SHEILA ZEDLEWSKI, ET AL., IS THERE A
SYSTEM SUPPORTING LOW-INCOME WORKING FAMILIES?, URBAN INST. (2006)).
102. Id.
103. Peteke Feijten & Clara H. Mulder, Gender, Divorce, and Housing—A Life Course
Perspective, in WOHNEN UND GENDER: THEORETISCHE, POLITISCHE, SOZIALE UND
RÄUMLICHE ASPEKTE 175, 179 (Darja Reuschke ed., 2010 (Ger.)) (“Welfare state
arrangements and alimony partly take away the differences in economic well-being after
divorce.”).
104. Brief for Amicus Curiae, supra note 15, at 7.
105. See Murphy, supra note 23.
106. Id.; see also David Abel, Voucher Shortage Hits Renters, BOSTON GLOBE, June
10, 2003, at B1, available at http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-7777839.html (noting the
shortage of public housing).
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improves in numerous ways beyond financial benefits.107 Alimony
payments remove the financial pressure faced by low-income women,
which inevitably improves their emotional health and parenting
capacity. 108 In the absence of an alimony award, women will struggle to
find adequate employment and could fall into poverty because of the
high likelihood that public benefits, if available, will not suffice.109
Women who do not have children with their ex-spouse also benefit
from alimony. Although childless women may suffer less from the
problems that mothers face upon divorce, they still face barriers to
becoming self-sufficient in the absence of an alimony award. 110 For
example, alimony helps childless women transition out of a marriage by
providing necessary resources, such as money to move. Moving may be
necessary as women without children are less likely to receive the
marital home upon divorce than are women with children.111
Additionally, alimony benefits women without children by providing
income to offset their lack of eligibility for most public welfare
programs, notably TANF, which is available only to poor adults with
dependents. 112 Even if poor women without children qualify for welfare,
the amount that they receive is often so low that welfare recipients may
have to supplement their income with covert contributions from family,
friends, or work. 113
Courts award alimony to compensate a recipient spouse, usually a
woman, for choices made during a marriage that primarily benefited the
payor spouse. 114 Despite advances made by women in education and the
workforce, women still suffer significantly more, post-divorce, than their
former spouses. 115 Those who are lower-income fare even worse as
107. McCoy, supra note 33, at 517-18.
108. See id. Financial difficulties tend to impact physical and mental health, which
contribute to poor parenting skills. Id.
109. See Poverty Among Women and Families, 2000-2010: Extreme Poverty Reaches
Record Levels as Congress Faces Critical Choices, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR. (Sept. 2011),
http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/povertyamongwomenandfamilies2010final.pdf;
McCoy, supra note 33, at 517.
110. See Martha Albertson Fineman, Societal Factors Affecting the Creation of Legal
Rules for Distribution of Property at Divorce, in AT THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW: FEMINISM
AND LEGAL THEORY 265, 277 (Martha A. Fineman & Nancy S. Thomadsen eds., 1991)
(“Women who are not mothers but choose to be unemployed during the marriage may be
considered overcompensated by the imposition of the partnership model.”).
111. Heather Ruth Wishik, Economics of Divorce: An Exploratory Study, 20:1 FAM.
L.Q. 79, 90 (1986).
112. See 42 U.S.C. § 601-19 (2006).
113. Edin, supra note 933.
114. See Ellman, supra note 21, at 50.
115. Brief for Amicus Curiae, supra note 15, at 13 (citing Gordon, supra note 33, at
1440).
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there is less money and marital property to divide in a divorce through
asset division. 116 Courts, therefore, award alimony as a way of ensuring
that the parties’ financial situations post-divorce do not differ so
dramatically that it is inequitable. 117 Courts also award alimony to
provide an essential tool for women to work towards self-sufficiency. 118
Therefore, any attempts to reform the alimony system must recognize
the economic realities of both parties post-divorce, namely, that alimony
remains necessary–even in 2014.
II. THE ALIMONY REFORM ACT OF 2011
The Alimony Reform Act of 2011119 introduced a new era of
domestic relations practice in Massachusetts with regard to spousal
support. The media hailed it as the biggest domestic relations policy
change in twenty-five years. 120 Notably, the Act has generated a
discussion about who the “winners” and “losers” are under this new
law. 121 As the Act’s most dramatic reform centers on the court’s new
ability to issue alimony orders with durational limits, most of the
discourse focuses on who benefits from these durational limits. 122 Prior
to the Act, judges did not have a formula or guidelines which assisted
them in determining the amount and duration of alimony orders. 123
Now, the Act provides guidelines enabling judges to order durational (or
term-limited) alimony. 124 Based primarily on the length of the marriage,
the duration of the alimony order could be, for example, one year, ten
years, until the payor repays the recipient, or until the payor retires. 125
The second half of this Article focuses on who gains from alimony
reform. The first section of this half discusses the obvious beneficiaries

116. See Ganong, supra note 844; Williams, supra note78, at 2232; McCoy, supra note
33, at 502, (citing Garrison, supra note 844).
117. See Ellman, supra note 21, at 49-50.
118. Linda D. Elrod, The Widening Door of Alimony–As Spouses’ Roles Change, the
Opportunities for Divorced Women Increase, 8 FAM. ADVOC. 4, 5 (1986).
119. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, §§ 48-55 (2011).
120. See Paul Tuthill, Alimony Reform Advances in Massachusetts, WAMC.ORG (July
25, 2011 12:16 PM), http://wamc.org/post/alimony-reform-advances-massachusetts (Alimony
Reform is “the first major change” to Massachusetts family law in the past 40 years).
121. See supra note 23.
122. See, e.g., George Donnelly, Massachusetts’ Pending Alimony Revolution, BOSTON
BUS. J. (June 3, 2011 1:19 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/boston/blog/bottom_line/2011/
06/massachusetts-pending-alimony.html.
123. See Rosenblatt v. Kazlow-Rosenblatt, 655 N.E.2d 640, 642 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995).
124. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, §§ 49-51 (2011).
125. Id.; see also Jennifer Levitz, Massachusetts Sets Limits on Alimony, WALL ST. J.
(Sept. 27, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240529702040106045765951507551
00270.html.
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of alimony reform. Alimony payors clearly benefit from finality in
orders, which allows them to have a set date that they will no longer
have to pay alimony. 126 The reform also assists the court by providing
guidelines yet retaining judicial discretion to deviate from those
guidelines. 127 Everyone benefits because of the probability that cases
will now settle more quickly. 128 The legal system profits by increasing
systemic efficiency: new settlement options reduce the number of trials
and hearings. 129 However, in what might be surprising to some, the
Alimony Reform Act of 2011 also benefits women by providing them
with an improved ability to obtain alimony. 130 The second section of
this Article dispels the myth that alimony reform only benefits payors,
primarily men, by highlighting key provisions that benefit women. 131
The third section will discuss some of the Act’s less favorable provisions
for alimony recipients, as well as the safety valves within those
provisions that protect recipients.132
A. Durational Limits Benefit Alimony Payors, Lawyers, and the Court
Alimony payors clearly benefit by the elimination of most
“forever” alimony orders. 133 Durational limits further advantage payors
126. Steve Hitner, The Shame of Massachusetts: Alimony Horror Stories, MASS.
ALIMONY REFORM, http://www.massalimonyreform.org/PDFs/Horror_Stories_MassAlimony
Reform.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2014) [hereinafter “The Shame of Massachusetts”].
127. See Jessica Fargen, Reform Could End Alimony For Life, BOSTONHERALD.COM
(Jan. 30, 2011), http://bostonherald.com/news/regional/view/20110130pols_crusaders_band_
together_to_support_radical_bill (“The bill sets clear guidelines for judges in determining
how long an ex pays another, yet retains judicial discretion.”).
128. Jack Flynn, Overhaul of Alimony Law Wins Praise, MASSLIVE.COM (Mar. 26,
2012 9:14 AM), http://www.masslive.com/news/index.ssf/2012/03/overhaul_of_alimony_la
w_wins_p.html (quoting Marc Fitzgerald, Chairman of the Massachusetts Bar Association’s
Family Law Section: “[j]udges, lawyers and divorcing couples will all benefit from the clarity
and specificity provided by the new law, which is considered one of the most important
changes in family law in recent decades”).
129. See Keith N. Hylton, Fee Shifting and Predictability of Law, 71 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 427, 438 (1996) (increased predictability will increase settlements); see also Ward
Farnsworth, The Economics of Enmity, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 211, 219 (2002).
130. Under the prior alimony law, many Massachusetts judges used seven years as the
“magic number” to determine whether a marriage was a short-term, mid-term, or long-term
marriage. See generally Cheryl L. Garrity & Abbe L. Hershberg, Alimony, Pensions and
Other Relief, in FAM. L. ADVOC. FOR LOW & MODERATE INCOME LITIGANTS 2008, at ch. 6-1
(F.L.A. M.C.L.E. Ser. no. 183, 2008). Cf. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, §§ 48-55 (2011).
131. See Murphy, supra note 23.
132. See id.; Reforming Massachusetts Alimony Laws, WGBH RADIO (Feb. 9, 2011),
http://wgbhradio.org/programs/Greater-Boston-11/episodes/Feb-9-2011Reforming-Massachus
etts-alimony-laws-24850.
133. Stephen Hitner, New Law Stops Injustice of Paying Plimony Forever, CNN.COM
(Mar. 11, 2012, 9:39 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/09/opinion/hitner-alimony-overhaulpro/index.html.
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by allowing alimony to terminate presumptively rather than requiring
payors to prove a change in circumstances in order to modify an alimony
order. 134 Furthermore, an alimony payor will now be able to calculate
the financial consequences of divorce, where alimony may be an issue,
through predictable and consistent guidelines.135
Concomitantly, durational limits benefit the legal community by
providing guidelines. 136 Prior to the Act, the Massachusetts Appeals
Court had issued disparate opinions on durational alimony. 137 The Ross
Court found that short-term orders may be appropriate if they are
intended to rehabilitate a supported spouse into the workforce.138 In
contrast, the Sampson Court found a three-year rehabilitative order to be
improper because the probate court had premised the order on
unpredictable future events. 139 While the Sampson holding seems to
imply that the court could order durational alimony based on definitive
future events, the courts have rarely found an event to be so certain that
it justified such an order. 140 Additionally, the Massachusetts Appeals
Court has ruled that alimony awards of limited duration are viewed with
suspicion. 141 The Chiancola Court held, in a summary disposition, that
the proper way to terminate or reduce alimony orders is through a
complaint for modification, not through an initial order limiting the
duration of alimony payments. 142 Although a summary disposition
134. See Schuler v. Schuler, 416 N.E.2d 197, 200 (Mass. 1981) (“To be successful in an
action to modify a judgment for alimony . . . the petitioner must demonstrate a material
change of circumstances since the entry of the earlier judgment.”).
135. See NY Senate Passes Alimony Guidelines as Part of No-Fault Divorce, MASS.
ALIMONY REFORM, http://www.massalimonyreform.org/news.html (last visited Feb. 14,
2014) (“By establishing guidelines for the amount and duration of the award, post-marital
income guidelines provide the consistency and predictability for spousal support that the Child
Support Standards Act has provided for child support.”).
136. See Fargen, supra note 127.
137. Compare Sampson v. Sampson, 816 N.E.2d 999, 1002, 1004 (Mass. App. Ct.
2004), and Goldman v. Goldman, 554 N.E.2d 860, 866 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990) (finding that
judges have great discretion in ordering alimony awards but cannot set durational limits when
such limit is based on uncertain future events), with Ross v. Ross, 734 N.E.2d 1192, 1195-96
(Mass. App. Ct. 2000) (finding that durational limits on alimony can be rehabilitative). See
also Gottsegen v. Gottsegen, 492 N.E.2d 1138, 1138 (Mass. 1986) (finding that a court can
only limit the duration of an alimony award based on a specific event which obviates the
recipient’s need for alimony).
138. Ross, 734 N.E.2d at 1195-96.
139. Sampson, 816 N.E.2d at 1004.
140. Goldman, 554 N.E.2d at 866 (value of a business). See also Gottsegen, 492
N.E.2d at 1138 (cohabitation); Martin v. Martin, 29 577 N.E.2d 754, 755 (Mass. App. Ct.
1990) (retirement); D.L. v. G.L., 811 N.E.2d 1013, 1026 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004) (husband’s
inheritance).
141. See Bak v. Bak, 511 N.E.2d 625, 633, n.14 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987).
142. Chiancola v. Kurgun, 2009 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1163 at *2 (Mass. App. Ct.
Nov. 9, 2009) (affirming trial court’s order of lifetime alimony or until payor remarried).
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pursuant to Appellate Practice Rule 1:28 is not binding precedent,
summary decisions do provide persuasive precedent. 143 The flaw in the
Chiancola court’s argument is that, without a change in circumstances,
the standard for modifying an order, the court could not adjust the
alimony order. 144
Due to the lack of clarity surrounding durational limits under the
prior alimony law, judges had differing practices when issuing alimony
orders. 145 Some judges did not order alimony, especially if the marriage
was short-term 146 or if the parties were relatively young and
employable. 147 Other judges focused on the present needs of the parties
and ordered alimony if there was need and ability to pay. 148 Family
lawyers expressed that alimony orders were often too discretionary and
varied widely depending on the judge assigned to the case.149 As a result
of these disparate practices, cases were more difficult to settle.150 With
fewer settlements, more cases went to trial, which had clogged the court
system and prolonged acrimony between the parties as well as added to
their litigation costs.151
B. Durational Alimony Provides New Opportunities for Recipients to
Obtain Alimony, Especially Those Women Divorcing After Short143. Id. See also MASS. APP. CT. REG. APP. PRAC.1:28.
144. See Schuler v. Schuler, 416 N.E.2d 197, 200 (1981) (“To be successful in an
action to modify a judgment for alimony . . . the petitioner must demonstrate a material
change of circumstances since the entry of the earlier judgment.”).
145. Compare Casey v. Casey, 948 N.E.2d 892, 898-99 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011) (finding
that wife would not be awarded alimony because although she might have been eligible for
alimony based on present income from her part-time job, the judge considered her earning
potential, finding that she was able to work full-time), with Greenberg v. Greenberg, 861
N.E.2d 801, 804 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007) (reduction in alimony payments based on recent
retirement was reversed because wife still needed the money and the husband still had the
ability to satisfy the original higher monthly alimony payments).
146. Richman v. Richman, 555 N.E.2d 243, 247-48 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990) (overturning
an alimony award giving primary significance to the couples to the fact that the marriage
“short-term”).
147. See, e.g., Casey, 948 N.E.2d at 899-900 (trial court failed to award alimony to the
wife because the trial judge was able to impute income to the wife based on her young age,
which supported the judge’s opinion that she was capable of working 40 hours per week).
148. See, e.g., Greenberg, 861 N.E.2d at 806-07.
149. See Jill Boynton, Massachusetts Proposes Changes To Alimony Laws,
BOSTON.COM (Dec. 18, 2009, 10:48 AM), http://www.boston.com/business/personalfinance
/managingyourmoney/archives/2009/12/massachusetts_p.html.
150. See Charles F. Vuotto, Jr., Alimony Trends, 33:1 N.J. FAM. LAW. 6, 8 (June 2012)
(acknowledging that a number of states, including Massachusetts, have struggled with
disparate practices regarding alimony awards and have consequently impeded parties ability
to settle); see also Marti E. Thurman, Maintenance: A Recognition of the Need for Guidelines,
33 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 971, 972 (1995).
151. See Lina A. Olup, Controlling Divorce Costs, 27 FAM. ADVOC. 16, 16 (2005).
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term Marriages
Durational limits benefit women by providing new opportunities
for recipients to obtain alimony. Alimony assists the increasing number
of women who are divorcing after short-term marriages, which is where
marriages last generally seven years or less. 152 Prior to the Act, judges
throughout Massachusetts rarely ordered alimony in short-term
marriages. 153 Without the ability to order durational alimony, judges felt
that they could only order alimony “forever” which would have been
inequitable in most short-term marriages. 154
In 1987, the Massachusetts Department of Public Health began
calculating the mode 155 of the most common length of marriage and the
data goes until 2006. In 2006, of Massachusetts’ marriages that ended in
divorce, the most common length of marriage was five years. The
highest mode was seven years in 2004 and the lowest was three years in
1987, 1988, 1990, and 1999. From 2000-2006, the mode ranged from 4
years to 7 years with 4 years being the most common. 156 In order for
alimony reform to be practical, it needed to reflect the prevalence of
short-term marriages.
1. General Term Alimony Guideline’s Inclusion of Short-Term
152. See CHARLES P. KINDREGAN, JR. ET AL., 8 MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE SERIES:
FAMILY LAW AND PRACTICE, § 53:1, :6 (4th ed.).
153. When a marriage lasted less than seven years, the judge was very unlikely to order
an alimony award. See Austin v. Austin, 819 N.E.2d 623, 630 n.15 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004);
Casey v. Casey, 948 N.E.2d 892, 899-900 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011); see also ROLAND F. CHASE,
14A MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE SERIES § 8.65 (4th ed.).
154. See Levitz, supra note 125 (discussing how courts ordered “lifetime” alimony,
which tied spouses together).
155. The Massachusetts Department of Public Health (MDPH) is the only organization
which calculates the data from Massachusetts and sorts it according to mode. National
organizations, such as the American Community Survey (ACS) began collecting national
marital data in 2008 but only calculates data from first marriages distinct from subsequent
marriages. Marriage and Divorce, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/hhes/socde
mo/marriage/data/acs/index.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2014). In 2009, according to the
national median, the duration of first marriages ending in divorce was eight years according to
ACS. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, NUMBER, TIMING, AND DURATION OF MARRIAGES AND
DIVORCES: 2009, 18 tbl.8 (Aug. 2011). Massachusetts marriage duration statistics for 20052006 are not published and were obtained at the Massachusetts Registry of Vital Statistics.
Figures from 2007-present are also unpublished, but available in raw form at the
Massachusetts Registry of Vital Statistics.
156. According to the MDPH, 2004 was the only year that reflects 7 years as the mode
length of marriage that ends in divorce. All years other than 2004 reflect fewer than 7 years
as the mode length of marriage that ends in divorce. From 2007-present, the most common
duration of marriages was 5 years, however this information is unpublished and available only
in raw form. For the figures dated 1980-2004, see table A-1 of the yearly report: MASS.
DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH: REGISTRY OF VITAL STATISTICS, ANNUAL REPORT OF VITAL
STATISTICS OF MASSACHUSETTS PUBLIC DOCUMENT #1.
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Marriages Will Increase the Number of Alimony Orders
Under the Alimony Reform Act, general term alimony guidelines
now include short-term marriages. 157 General term alimony serves as
the “catch all” term to encompass all existing alimony orders and all new
alimony orders issued under the new alimony law that are not otherwise
designated. 158 General term alimony provides “periodic payment of
support to a recipient spouse who is economically dependent.” 159
In common parlance, the general public most frequently thinks of
general term alimony when referencing alimony. 160 Judges may now
issue orders, and parties may negotiate for general term alimony
regardless of the length of the marriage.161 The duration designations for
general term alimony largely mirror the American Law Institute’s (ALI)
recommendations on alimony. 162 Based on the number of months of
marriage, general term alimony cannot exceed a certain length, as
detailed in Table 1. Making general term alimony available after shortterm marriages is a groundbreaking change to Massachusetts’
matrimonial law. 163

157. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 49(b) (2011).
158. All existing alimony awards are deemed general term alimony orders under the
new alimony law. § 48, n.4(b).
159. § 48.
160. See The Shame of Massachusetts, supra note 1266; Jeffrey Sánchez, House Passes
Alimony Reform Legislation, JAMAICA PLAIN PATCH BLOG (July 21, 2011, 1:44 PM) http://ja
maicaplain.patch.com/blog_posts/house-passes-alimony-reform-legislation (acknowledging
that “general-term” alimony is the default form of alimony).
161. See § 48 (defining general term alimony as “the periodic payment of support to a
recipient spouse who is economically dependent”); BOS. B. ASS’N, REPORT OF THE JOINT
MBA/BBA ALIMONY TASK FORCE: ALIMONY OR SPOUSAL SUPPORT GUIDELINES WHERE
THERE ARE NO DEPENDENT CHILDREN 3, available at http://www.bostonbar.org/prs/nr_0910
/BBA_MBA_Alimony_Task_Force_Alimony_Report.pdf (stating that general term alimony
can be awarded for a specified period of time, even if the marriage was only five years or
less).
162. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 5.06 (2002).
163. See Lisa van der Pool, Support builds for wholesale alimony reform, BOS. BUS. J.
(June 3, 2011, 6:00 AM), www.bizjournals.com/boston/print-edition/2011/06/03/supportbuilds-for-wholesale-alimony.html?page=all.
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Table 1: Durational Limits on General Term Alimony
Length of
Maximum Duration of General Term
Marriage
Alimony
0 – 5 years
50% the number of months of the marriage
5 – 10 years
60% of the number of months of the marriage
10 – 15 years
70% of the number of months of the marriage
15 – 20 years
80% of the number of months of the marriage
More than 20 years Indefinite length
Source: MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 49 (2011).
2. The Alimony Reform Act Introduces New Categories of
Alimony Available to Recipients
Prior to the Alimony Reform Act, Massachusetts had statutorily
recognized only one type of alimony. 164 In addition to general term
alimony, discussed above, the Alimony Reform Act provides for three
other categories of alimony: rehabilitative, reimbursement, and
transitional. 165 One reason for these additional alimony categories is to
allow judges the opportunity to order time-limited alimony in specific
situations. 166 Additionally, these new categories give judges more
discretion to fashion an alimony order appropriate to each individual
case. 167 This benefits recipients in cases where the duration of the award
under general term alimony would be insufficient.168 Under general
term alimony, in marriages lasting less than five years, barring deviation,
the judge may only order alimony for fifty percent of the number of
months of the marriage. 169 For a 59 month marriage, which is just shy
of five years, the judge may only order 29.5 months of general-term
alimony, which is slightly less than two and a half years.170 However,
following the same 59 month marriage, the judge may order up to three
164. § 34 (amended 2011). See also CHARLES P. KINDREGAN, JR. ET AL., 8
MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE SERIES: FAMILY LAW AND PRACTICE, § 28:7 (4th ed.); Yamiche
Alcindor, Should Alimony Laws Be Changed?, USATODAY.COM (Jan. 18, 2012, 7:24 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfi/basics/story/2012-01-05/alimony-law-reform/526421
00/1.
165. §§ 49-52.
166. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 1622, at § 5.06
cmt. a. (“A fixed-term award communicates the law’s expectation that after its expiration the
former spouses will no longer have financial obligations to or claims upon one another.”).
167. See McCoy, supra note 33; Flynn, supra note 128 (quoting Marc Fitzgerald.
Chairman of the Massachusetts Bar Association's Family Law Section: “Judges, lawyers and
divorcing couples will all benefit from the clarity and specificity provided by the new law,
which is considered one of the most important changes in family law in recent decades.”).
168. See McCoy, supra note 33; Flynn, supra note 1288 and accompanying text.
169. §4 9(b)(1).
170. Id.
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years of transitional alimony and up to five years of rehabilitative
alimony. 171 Rehabilitative, reimbursement, and transitional alimony
provide vehicles for judges who wish to order longer terms than under
general term alimony. 172
Moreover, lawyers may argue that the Act’s income guidelines
provision does not apply in exceptional cases. 173 The Act clearly states
that “[e]xcept for reimbursement alimony or circumstances warranting
deviation for other forms of alimony, the amount of alimony should
generally not exceed the recipient’s need or 30 to 35 percent of the
difference between the parties’ gross incomes established at the time of
the order being issued.” 174 Income guidelines, specifically, do not apply
to reimbursement alimony because of the nature of that category of
alimony (discussed below). 175 It is also clear that in most cases where
courts award general term alimony, the guidelines should apply, as most
of those cases do not present rare circumstances meriting deviation.
However, unlike general term alimony, rehabilitative and transitional
alimony, by their very nature, will present unusual issues. Lawyers may
argue that the guidelines act as a floor not a ceiling and that a party’s
particular rehabilitative or transitional alimony circumstance is so unique
that it should warrant a deviation from the income guidelines. This may
benefit alimony recipients through higher-than-guidelines alimony
awards, but it may also provide lower-than-guidelines alimony awards
for the same reasons. 176
3. Rehabilitative Alimony
The modern trend in spousal support law has shifted toward
awarding rehabilitative alimony. 177 Massachusetts defines rehabilitative
alimony as “the periodic payment of support to a recipient spouse who is
expected to become economically self-sufficient by a predicted time,
such as, without limitation, reemployment; completion of job training; or
receipt of a sum due from the payor spouse under a judgment.” 178
Rehabilitative alimony differs from other categories of alimony because

171. §§ 50(b)-52(a).
172. Transitional alimony can be ordered for up to three years, which is longer than
only some of the shortest durational limits under general term alimony. Transitional alimony
may not be extended or modified. § 52.
173. §53(b).
174. Id.
175. §51(c).
176. See The Divorce Lawyers, supra note 27 (discussing the ability of judges to use
discretion to stray from the guidelines).
177. See McCoy, supra note 33 citing Garrison, supra note 8484.
178. § 48.
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courts do not award it to reimburse or compensate a spouse. 179 The
theory behind rehabilitative alimony is that with some financial support,
the recipient spouse will be able to obtain the skills, training, or
education needed to subsist without alimony. 180 More than any other
theory of alimony, rehabilitative alimony respects the oft times unequal
spousal roles within a marriage and seeks to reduce the disadvantages to
the recipient spouse upon divorce. 181
Several examples of when rehabilitative alimony may apply
include:
• the spouse that has almost completed his or her schooling
and needs alimony in order to finish the remaining
classes; 182
• the spouse that needs job training in order to integrate into
the workforce; 183
• the spouse that has experienced domestic violence and
needs time to recover from the abuse; 184 and
• the spouse that needs to finish six months of physical
therapy sessions before continuing to work in
construction. 185
The Act does not state how long a marriage must last to qualify for
rehabilitative alimony. 186 Presumptively, courts may order rehabilitative
alimony for any length of marriage. 187 However, courts may only order
rehabilitative alimony for up to five years.188 In terms of duration,
rehabilitative alimony provides the greatest contrast to general term
alimony, as the difference in the maximum durational caps between the
two types of alimony, given a five-year marriage, (where rehabilitative

179. Id; see also Daniel Jones, Rehabilitative Alimony–The Goal of Self Support, 20 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 25, 26 (2012).
180. See Adlakha v. Adlakha, 844 N.E.2d 700, 709 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006) (“before
awarding rehabilitative alimony, the recipient spouse’s realistic prospects for self-sufficiency
must be considered with care.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Cf. McCoy, supra note
33, at 522 (stating rehabilitative alimony generally requires proof that the payor would have
obtained the education or training sought but for the marriage, such as proof that the payor
was previously accepted to an educational program and did not attend).
181. See McCoy, supra note 33.
182. 24A AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 763 (2008).
183. Id.; § 48.
184. Jones, supra note 179, at 27 (“When deciding whether to award rehabilitative
support, the California divorce court must consider . . . any history of domestic violence . . .”).
185. See Linda Baillif Marshall, Rehabilitative Alimony: An Old Wolf in New Clothes,
13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 667, 680-81 (1985).
186. See § 50.
187. Id.
188. Id.
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would result in a five year cap, and general term would result in a twoand-a-half year cap) is nearly two-and-a-half years. 189
Rehabilitative alimony is modifiable in limited circumstances. If a
recipient had a one-year, or even a five-year rehabilitative alimony
order, she could seek an extension of that order.190 The standards for an
extension of the original order are very specific:
[t]he alimony term for rehabilitative alimony shall be not more than
five years. Unless the recipient has remarried, the rehabilitative
alimony may be extended on a complaint for modification upon a
showing of compelling circumstances in the event that: (1)
unforeseen events prevent the recipient spouse from being selfsupporting at the end of the term with due consideration to the length
of the marriage; (2) the court finds that the recipient tried to become
self-supporting; and (3) the payor is able to pay without undue
191
burden.

While it is a challenge to meet the standard, rehabilitative alimony
modifications help alimony recipients who experience an unforeseen
event which may prohibit their ability to be self-supporting without the
assistance of alimony. For example, consider a recipient who suffered
four years of physical abuse by her ex-spouse. The court may have
initially ordered one year of alimony with the belief, held by all parties,
that the recipient would physically be able to find work after the divorce.
However, during the year, the recipient suffers new back pains and later
learns that the payor had permanently damaged her spine, requiring six
months of physical therapy before she could even sit comfortably. In
contrast, the former spouse is earning even more money due to a
promotion at work. The court might extend the recipient’s alimony
order until a set time, determined by the court, to allow her to fully
recover and conduct a job search. 192
4. Reimbursement Alimony
Reimbursement alimony is based on a spousal contribution theory
mirroring the American Law Institute’s recommendations. 193 The
Alimony Reform Act defines reimbursement alimony:
189. Id. Compare § 49, with § 50. The statistics are based on a non-deviation general
term alimony case.
190. See § 50(b).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 5.05(1) (2002) (“A spouse
should be entitled at dissolution to compensation for the earning-capacity loss arising from his
or her disproportionate share during marriage of the care of the marital children, or of the
children of either spouse.”) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW].
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as the periodic or one-time payment of support to a recipient spouse
after a marriage of not more than 5 years to compensate the recipient
for economic or noneconomic contribution to the financial resources
of the payor spouse, such as enabling the payor spouse to complete
194
an education or job training.

Reimbursement alimony does not seek to equalize income. 195
Rather, reimbursement alimony compensates a spouse who made
financially quantifiable sacrifices during a short-term marriage to
enhance the future earning capacity of the other spouse. 196
Examples of reimbursement alimony may include, but are not
limited to, the following:
• the spouse who paid $100,000 for the other spouse to
attend business school with the assumption that they would
share in her increased salary after she graduated; 197
• the spouse that gave up his teaching job for two years to
care for the home and other spouse’s children while she
advanced in her career; 198 and
• the spouses who pooled their money so that they could
attend college one spouse at a time but divorced before the
second spouse could attend school. 199
Reimbursement alimony is not subject to income guidelines
because the amount of compensation differs in each case. 200
Additionally, judges can order either periodic alimony payments,
mimicking general term alimony, or one lump-sum payment. 201 The
Act’s introduction of lump sum payments assists an alimony recipient
who can prove to the court that the payor has the ability to pay, and that
she needs money quickly to pay for tuition, job training, or some other
large expense that she could not afford with periodic payments. 202

194. § 48.
195. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW, supra note 193, at § 5.02cmt. a.
196. Id. at §5.02(3)(c).
197. See Brenda Ruel Sharton, Spousal Interest in Professional Degrees: Solving the
Compensation Dilemma, 31 B.C. L. REV. 749, 752 (1990).
198. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW, supra note 193, at § 5.02(3)(a).
199. See Sharton, supra note 197197, at 757.
200. Fern L. Frolin, Tips for Handling Cases Under the New Alimony Law, 56:2 BOS.
BUS. J. (May 8, 2012), http://bostonbarjournal.com/2012/05/08/tips-for-handling-cases-underthe-new-alimony-law-by-fern-l-frolin/.
201. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 49 (2011).
202. See also Shawn Golesorkhi, Lump Sum Spousal Support, GOLESORKHI.NET
http://www.golesorkhi.net/newsletters/divorce/lump-sum-spousal-support/ (last visited Feb.
14, 2014).
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5. Transitional Alimony
Transitional alimony is another category of alimony where the
number of potential qualified recipients increases under the new law.203
Also called “bridge-the-gap” or “reorientation” alimony, 204
Massachusetts defines transitional alimony as “the periodic or one-time
payment of support to a recipient spouse after a marriage of not more
than 5 years to transition the recipient spouse to an adjusted lifestyle or
location as a result of the divorce.” 205 Courts generally award
transitional alimony when property division does not equitably suffice to
meet the needs of the supported spouse. 206
For example, if Britney Spears and Kevin Federline were residents
of Massachusetts and filing for divorce in 2013, Kevin might seek
transitional alimony. Britney Spears is a famous singer whose estimated
net worth is $200 million. 207 Kevin was engaged to another woman who
was expecting his child when he landed a job as one of Britney’s backup
dancers. 208 Five months later, Kevin and Britney were married.209 Two
years later, they separated. 210 Imagine the following scenario: at the
time of divorce, Kevin has no income and no savings. Kevin seeks to
transition to a quieter lifestyle in a more rural environment outside the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Under the Alimony Reform Act,
based on these facts alone, Kevin might ask the court for transitional
alimony to allow him to purchase a plane ticket and pay first and last
months’ rent as well as a security deposit for an apartment.
The facts of a case which merit transitional alimony may also be
sufficient to deviate from the income guidelines. In fact, the alimony
recipient who seeks a significant amount of money in one lump sum,
maybe to cover moving expenses, is advantaged most by transitional
alimony. 211 However, neither party can modify transitional alimony,
203. See § 48.
204. See McCoy, supra note 33, at 512.
205. § 48.
206. See McCoy, supra note 33, at 512.
207. Britney Spears Net Worth, CELEBRITY NET WORTH http://www.celebritynetworth.
com/richest-celebrities/singers/britney-spears-net-worth/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2014).
208. See Daily Mail Reporter, Britney Spears admits she married Kevin Federline ‘for
the wrong reasons’, MAIL ONLINE (Nov. 20, 2008, 6:31 PM) http://www.dailymail.co.uk/tv
showbiz/article-1087677/Britney-Spears-admits-married-Kevin-Federline-wrong-rea
sons.html.
209. Id.
210. After Two Years, Britney Has Had Enough, CNN.COM (Nov. 7,
2006), http://articles.cnn.com/2006-11-07/entertainment/spears.divorce.reut_1_kevin-federlin
e-jayden-james-sean-preston?_s=PM:SHOWBIZ.
211. Stevenson & Lynch, P.C. & Justin L. Kelsey, Esq., The Divorce Spousal Support
Calculator, http://www.kelseytrask.com/Docs/SpousalSupport.pdf (last revised Feb. 14,
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even if there is a change in circumstances, and the maximum duration of
any such award is three years. 212
Durational alimony, such as rehabilitative, transitional, and
reimbursement alimony, benefits women. Divorces, which occur more
frequently than in the past, have shortened the average length of a
marriage. 213 Durational alimony provides judges the discretion to order
alimony in short-term marriages without the threat of the order lasting
forever. The addition of guidelines for short-term marriages in general
term alimony as well as new categories of short-term alimony encourage
judges to award durational alimony where appropriate. On balance,
recipients’ new opportunity to obtain alimony are so beneficial as to
negate any detriment from the new duration limit.
C. The Alimony Reform Act Contains Provisions Less Favorable for
Alimony Recipients; However Those Provisions Do Provide Safety
Valves to Protect Recipients
1. Presumptive Alimony Termination at Payor’s Retirement Age
The retirement provision of the Alimony Reform Act has generated
the most attention other than the durational alimony provisions. 214
General term alimony, under both the Alimony Reform Act and
Massachusetts’ former alimony statute, terminates upon the death of the
payor, death of the recipient, remarriage of the recipient, or following a
court order terminating alimony. 215 However, under the new alimony
law, general term alimony also presumptively terminates upon the
payor’s retirement. 216

2014).
212. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 52(a) (2011).
213. ROSE M. KRIEDER & RENEE ELLIS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION
REPORTS, “NUMBER, TIMING, AND DURATION OF MARRIAGES AND DIVORCES: 2009, TBL.4
(2011).
214. See Hitner, supra note 133 (wherein the article mentions retirement alimony only
after durational alimony in discussing the features of the Alimony Reform Act), Charles P.
Kindregan, Jr., Reforming Alimony: Massachusetts Reconsiders Postdivorce Spousal Support,
46 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 13, 13 (“The refusal of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in
2010 to create a presumption in favor of an obligor’s request to be relieved of his alimony
obligation to his long-divorced wife when he reached the age of full retirement, as defined by
the Social Security Act, helped to set off a discussion in the bar and among the public about
whether alimony needed rethinking.”).
215. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, §34 (repealed 2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, §
49 (2011); see also, Cohan v. Feuer, 810 N.E.2d 1222, 1228 (Mass. 2004) (holding that
alimony terminates upon the death of either payer or remarriage of recipient); Keller v.
O’Brien, 682 N.E.2d 589, 593 (holding that recipient’s remarriage made prima face case for
alimony termination unless extraordinary circumstances were shown).
216. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.208, § 49 (2011).
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This dramatic change to alimony law will negatively affect
divorced women after long-term marriages with alimony orders that they
thought were “forever.” 217 However, since the law applies only to
merged agreements, (when the parties agree that the court may modify
alimony upon a change of circumstances), it may be argued that those
recipients knew or should have known that a court could modify their
agreement at any time in the future. 218 The Legislature clearly intended
the law apply retroactively only to merged agreements because the
legislation provides a phase-in structure to modify agreements based on
the new law which is determined by the length of the parties’
marriages. 219 This phasing in of the new law will enable alimony
recipients with merged agreements to have time to plan for their
financial futures before potential alimony termination.220 The law does
not apply, of course, to surviving alimony agreements (where the parties
have agreed that alimony may never be modified).221 Many agreements
are considered surviving when the alimony agreement is ambiguous. 222
When the Massachusetts Legislature debated alimony reform, the
most frequent criticism of the prior law was that a payor could not afford
to retire. 223 Because of the political impetus around this issue, it was

217. See Real Losers in Alimony Reform, supra note 23.
218. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 48 n.4(c) (West 2011). Determining whether
an existing alimony provision of an agreement survived or merged into the divorce judgment
is the first step in reviewing existing separation agreements to ascertain if the new law applies.
See Cournoyer v. Cournoyer, 663 N.E.2d 863, 865-66 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996). If alimony
merges, then the court may modify the agreement. Id. at 866. However, if alimony survives
the judgment, alimony will not be modifiable absent very unusual circumstances. See id. at
867. The new alimony law, § 48-55, does not alter this paradigm. In fact, the session notes
specifically state that the new law shall not be interpreted to allow parties to existing surviving
agreements to seek or receive a modification to their alimony agreement. MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 208, §48 n.4(c) (West 2011). As session notes have the same force and effect as the
statute, it is clear that the law’s intent is not to modify any surviving agreements. See
NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 28.10
(6thed. 2002); see also McDonald v. Faulkner, 27 N.E. 883, 884 (1891) (“But, if that was its
construction [in the session laws], that is still its construction, notwithstanding its codification
in the General and Public Statutes.”). Thus, this law applies to all cases prospectively but
only retroactively to those cases that involved merged alimony clauses in separation
agreements.
219. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 48 n.5 (West 2011).
220. Frolin, supra note 200.
221. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 48 n.4(e) (West 2011); Cournoyer, 663
N.E.2d at 865 (stating that a survived agreement cannot be modified unless there is
“something more than material change of circumstances . . . or . . . countervailing equities”)
(citations omitted).
222. See, e.g., Cooper v. Cooper, 680 N.E.2d 1173, 1177-78 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997).
223. See, e.g., Nancy Van Tine, What Massachusetts Alimony Reform Really Means,
HUFFINGTON POST (July 27, 2011, 1:06 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nancy-vantine/what-massachusetts-alimony-reform-means_b_909252.html.
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clear that a retirement provision would be included in the new
legislation. 224 The question emerged as to whether alimony should
terminate at a payor’s actual retirement age, as defined by the Social
Security Administration, or at his or her actual retirement.225 Retirement
age is the more definitive of the two options and its inclusion in the Act
prevents recipients from speculating as to when the payor may retire.226
This places the recipient in a knowledgeable position. Instead of a
termination date upon a payor’s actual retirement, which the recipient
may not know until the payor files for a modification, alimony ends at a
date certain. 227 Alimony recipients can now financially plan with more
certainty.
Despite the financial planning benefits, alimony termination at
retirement is one of the Act’s less favorable provisions for recipients. 228
However, the retirement provision contains a safety valve. 229 Even if a
payor retires, judges can still exercise discretion to order alimony postretirement where appropriate. 230 “When the court enters an initial
alimony judgment, the court may set a different alimony termination
date for good cause shown. In granting deviation, the court shall enter
written findings of the reasons for deviation.” 231 While the courts will
ultimately determine what “good cause shown” means pursuant to the
Act, judges may still extend alimony orders if appropriate. 232 For

224. See Kris Frieswick, Till Death Do Us Pay, BOS. MAG. (July 2009),
http://www.bostonmagazine.com/articles/2009/06/till-death-do-us-pay/5/; Alimony Reform
Bill (H1785) Delayed Until the Next Legislative Session, (July 26, 2010), MASS. ELECTION
2010, http://massachusetts-election-2010.com/3090/alimony-reform-bill-h1785-delayed-untilthe-next-legislative-session/ (reporting, at an early stage, before any draft from the Task Force
was made available, that it was likely, based on several conversations, that a provision
emphasizing a payor’s right to retire would be present).
225. See, e.g., RA Jaworski, Is Reform Coming Soon for Massachusetts Alimony
Laws?, BOS. DIVORCE L. (Oct. 1, 2010), http://knowledgebase.findlaw.com/kb/2010/Sep/156
056.html (suggesting that alimony payments would terminate upon actual retirement of the
payor, as opposed to retirement age); Ashley Studley, Milford State Rep. hopes to get alimony
changes passed, MILFORD DAILY NEWS (May 25, 2011, 12:33 AM), http://www.milforddaily
news.com/news/x1078554660/Milford-State-Rep-hopes-to-get-alimony-changes-passed
(“This makes it clear alimony should terminate at age of retirement at the federal law, 66 . . .
.”) (citations omitted).
226. Matt Allen, Long Awaited Massachusetts Alimony Reform, MENSRIGHTS.COM
(Feb. 4, 2011, 6:19 PM), http://www.mensrights.com/index.php/Articles/Long-AwaitedMassachusetts-Alimony-Reform.html.
227. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 49(f) (2011).
228. Murphy, supra note 23.
229. See § 49(f).
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. See Frolin, supra note 200 (“Mastery of the new law will require . . . development
of a lucid body of interpretive appellate law.”).
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example, a judge may order alimony in a divorce case until after the
payor retires, where the parties are divorcing close to retirement age with
few assets to divide and one party continues to earn a high salary. 233
This provides judicial discretion to ensure fairness to both parties and
softens the hard line of the retirement provision in the Act. 234
2. The Alimony Reform Act’s Cohabitation Provision Affects
Alimony Recipients Both Negatively and Positively
The Alimony Reform Act introduces another significant change to
the law by providing that a court may “suspend, reduce, or terminate an
alimony order if the recipient spouse cohabitates with another for at least
three months.” 235 This provision of the Act, along with the retirement
provision, is considered by some to be the most inflexible and harmful to
recipients. 236
While the ability of the spouse to modify alimony if the other
spouse cohabitates after three months disadvantages alimony recipients,
payors must first meet a significant burden. Cohabitation requires
persons to maintain a common household together for three months.237
It is insufficient to just allege that the recipient spouse is living with
another or that the recipient spouse may be romantically involved with
another. Payors must prove that recipient spouses are actually forming a
common household by providing evidence such as oral or written
statements or representations made to third parties regarding the
relationship of the persons, proof of economic interdependence, or the

233. The judge must also make written findings in order to extend alimony beyond
retirement age. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 53(e) (2011); Jacquelynne Bowman, et al,
FAMILY LAW ADVOCACY FOR LOW AND MODERATE INCOME LITIGANTS 184 (2008),
available at http://www.masslegalservices.org/FamilyLawAdvocacyForLowAndModerateInc
omeLitigants (“The older the parties, the more likely the court will award alimony . . .”).
234. Fargen, supra note 1277 (“The bill sets clear guidelines for judges in determining
how long an ex pays another, yet retains judicial discretion.”).
235. § 49(d). Cf. Gottsegen v. Gottsegen, 492 N.E.2d 1133, 1138 (Mass. 1986)
(holding that an ex-spouse has no right to control whether the recipient of alimony lives with
another).
236. See, e.g., Howard I. Goldstein, Cohabitation and Alimony Reform,
MASSACHUSETTS-DIVORCE.COM (Feb. 20, 2012), http://www.massachusetts-divorce.com/b
log/?p=161 (cohabitation provision is likely to increase litigation).
237. Maintaining a common household is defined as involving:
(i) oral or written statements or representations made to third parties regarding the
relationship of the persons; (ii) the economic interdependence of the couple or
economic dependence of 1 person on the other; (iii) the persons engaging in
conduct and collaborative roles in furtherance of their life together; (iv) the benefit
in the life of either or both of the persons from their relationship; (v) the community
reputation of the persons as a couple; or (vi) other relevant and material factors.
§ 49(d)(1)(i)-(vi).
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community reputation of the persons as a couple.238 Payors will likely
need more time than three months amass the evidence to meet that
burden. 239
Additionally, it is likely that in the time it takes for the payor to file,
serve, and then schedule a hearing, far more than three months of
cohabitation will elapse which will allow a recipient more time to
prepare for the loss of alimony. 240 Finally, like the retirement provision,
recipients know or should know about the Act’s cohabitation provision
before they choose to cohabitate.241 Therefore, if they choose to
cohabitate, it is with full awareness that they must financially plan for
alimony termination. 242
Like the retirement provision, the cohabitation clause also provides
a safety valve for those alimony recipients who may enter into a
cohabitating relationship that later terminates.243 Former alimony
recipients may seek reinstatement upon termination of the cohabitation
as long as the reinstatement does not last longer than the termination
date of the original order. 244 Reinstatement may be appropriate in
certain circumstances when a recipient entered into a cohabitation that
shortly ends. 245 For example, John Doe is paying general term alimony
to Jane Doe for fifteen years because they had a nineteen-year marriage.
One year after the divorce, Jane begins cohabitating with Bob and John’s
alimony obligation terminates. Jane and Bob break up after six months.

238. § 49(d) (2011).
239. Maureen McBrien, Impact of cohabitation under Alimony Reform Act, MASS. L.
WKLY., Apr. 30, 2012, at 39 (“While not explicitly so stating, the enumerated factors are
reflective of a romantic relationship akin to a marriage, as opposed to simply sharing a
primary residence with, for example, a sibling, roommate, nanny or temporary boarders.”);
Howard I. Goldstein, Article On New Alimony Law, MASSACHUSETTS-DIVORCE.COM (Mar. 1,
2012), http://www.massachusetts-divorce.com/blog/?p=189 (“The first is that three months
may be an insufficient time to know whether a co-habiting relationship will last.”).
240. § 49(d)(1)(i)-(vi) (payor cannot even file for a modification of payment until the
recipient has already been living with another for at least three months).
241. See Frolin, supra note 200.
242. See id.
243. § 49(d)(2) (if recipient ceases to cohabitate, alimony payments can be reinstated);
see also John Hayward & Guy Brandon, Cohabitating in the 21st Century, JUBILEE CENTRE, 1
(2010), http://www.jubilee-centre.org/uploaded/files/resource_344.pdf (“This suggests that
marriage is still the preferred outcome for most couples. Cohabitation, on its own terms, is
generally a short-lived relationship.”).
244. § 49(d)(2).
245. See Rebecca L. Palmer & Timothy C. Haughee, Proposed Laws Could Have a
Drastic Impact on Alimony Recipients in Florida, LOWNDES, DROSDICK, DOSTER, KANTOR &
REED, P.A. (Feb. 9, 2012), http://www.lowndes-law.com/publications-presentations/1163proposed-laws-could-drastic-impact-alimony-recipients-florida (acknowledging the harm that
would come to alimony recipients if they could not reinstate after a cohabitating relationship
ended).
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Jane can seek reinstatement of her alimony from the original alimony
order (fifteen years) subtracting the time that Jane already received
alimony (one year) and further subtracting the time that Jane and Bob
cohabitated (six months) equaling a reinstatement of thirteen and a half
years of alimony. Moreover, the cohabitation provisions of the Act only
apply in general term alimony and do not apply in rehabilitative,
reimbursement, or transitional alimony. 246 This enables recipients with
unique circumstances meriting rehabilitative, reimbursement, or
transitional alimony to avoid one of the less recipient-favorable 247
provisions of the Alimony Reform Act.
Judges may reinstate alimony after a cohabitation relationship but
not after a re-marriage. 248 This is because cohabitation is far less stable
than marriage. 249 Reinstatement, therefore, protects an alimony recipient
in the event of a poor relationship choice after divorce. It is important to
note that the Act does not guarantee alimony reinstatement after
cohabitation. 250 The recipients bear the burden of proving why they
continue to need alimony and why the payors should reinstate
payments. 251 The reinstatement safety valve ensures that alimony
recipients, especially those with lower incomes, receive the support
merited by the original marriage and necessary for self-sustainability. 252
While the three-month cohabitation provision is harsh, it is balanced by
the recipients’ ability to ask the court to reinstate alimony if the
cohabitation fails.253
3. Deviation Factors Allow Judges to Exercise Discretion for the
Betterment of Alimony Recipients
The Alimony Reform Act benefits parties in a divorce by providing
predictability, finality, and new opportunities to obtain alimony.

246. Compare §§ 50-52, with §49(d) (section 49(d) specifically indicates that
cohabitation will terminate alimony only for general term alimony, and sections 50-52
detailing rehabilitative, reimbursement, and transitional alimony specifically list the
circumstances that will cause alimony to terminate, and cohabitation is not listed).
247. Howard I. Goldstein, Cohabitation and Alimony Reform, MASSACHUSETTSDIVORCE.COM, http://www.massachusetts-divorce.com/blog/?p=161 (Feb. 20, 2012)
(cohabitation provision is likely to increase litigation).
248. See Gerrig v. Sneirson, 183 N.E.2d 131, 133 (1962) (acknowledging that after a
remarriage, a spouse should not be eligible for reinstatement of alimony).
249. See Lerman, supra note 39, at 73.
250. § 49(d)(2) (stating that alimony “may” be reinstated, not that the alimony “must”
be reinstated).
251. See id.
252. See McBrien, supra note 239 (acknowledging that payor’s relief from payment
may only be temporary, as those who still need alimony can have it reinstated).
253. See Palmer, supra note 2455; see also § 49(d)(2).
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However, there is a minority of cases for which the court should not
apply the alimony guidelines, and the Act provides safeguards for those
cases. 254 The Act allows judges to deviate from the guidelines upon
certain factors. 255 Grounds for deviation include:
(1) advanced age; chronic illness; or unusual health circumstances
of either party; (2) tax considerations applicable to the parties; (3)
whether the payor spouse is providing health insurance and the
cost of health insurance for the recipient spouse; (4) whether the
payor spouse has been ordered to secure life insurance for the
benefit of the recipient spouse and the cost of such insurance; (5)
sources and amounts of unearned income, including capital gains,
interest and dividends, annuity and investment income from assets
that were not allocated in the parties [sic.] divorce; (6) significant
premarital cohabitation that included economic partnership or
marital separation of significant duration, each of which the court
may consider in determining the length of the marriage; (7) a
party’s inability to provide for that party’s own support by reason
of physical or mental abuse by the payor; (8) a party’s inability to
provide for that party’s own support by reason of that party’s
deficiency of property, maintenance or employment opportunity;
and (9) upon written findings, any other factor that the court
256
deems relevant and material.

Deviation factors effectively balance the need for predictability in
the law while maintaining the judicial discretion necessary to safeguard
against strict guidelines.257 By employing deviation factors, courts will
have the discretion to stray from the recommended formula in cases with
unique circumstances.258 Such discretion allows judges flexibility,
providing a safety valve for alimony recipients in extreme circumstances
necessitating an adjustment from the guidelines. 259 For example, if a
recipient spouse develops muscular dystrophy after a short term
marriage, the court can find that alimony should extend beyond the
durational limits if the payor has the ability to pay. Or, if a wealthy
alimony payor, in good health, continues to work beyond his retirement
254. See §§ 48-55; H. 3617, 187th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2011); see also L.J. Jackson,
Alimony Arithmetic: More States Are Looking at Formulas to Regulate Spousal Support, ABA
J. (Feb. 1, 2012, 3:30 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/alimony_arithmetic_
more_states_are_looking_at_formulas_to_regulate_spousal/.
255. § 53.
256. § 53(e).
257. See L.J. Jackson, Alimony Arithmetic, A.B.A. J. (Feb. 1, 2012, 3:30 AM), http://w
ww.abajournal.com/magazine/article/alimony_arithmetic_more_states_are_looking_at_formul
as_to_regulate_spousal/.
258. Gregory N. Gunn, Note, Spousal Support Awards in Utah: An Alternative
Approach, 13 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 379, 384 (2011).
259. See id. at 385 (“Deviation factors work as a safety valve for the judge to use when
the circumstances make an adjustment absolutely necessary.”).
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age and, without alimony the recipient spouse would be homeless or
starving, the court may extend alimony beyond the retirement age.
Thus, deviation factors are a vital tool to ensure that divorced lowincome recipients do not suffer from formulas resulting in unjust
alimony orders.
4. The Increased Settlements Due to the Alimony Reform Act
Benefit Women
In addition to the safeguards mentioned above, the greatest
safeguard in a case is usually settlement. 260 Most family law cases settle
before trial, but alimony cases have always been the exception.261 By
providing clear directions as to the amount and duration of alimony
awards, the Act will provide certainty and predictable outcomes. 262
Outcome unpredictability, as a result of vague alimony laws, made
negotiations more difficult. 263 Increased predictability will lead to
increased settlements.264 Moreover, with clear guidelines, the case law
surrounding alimony decisions will be more consistent, and will
encourage complex divorce cases to settle before going to trial.265
Settlements frequently benefit the lower-income spouse in a divorce
because trials can be time-consuming and expensive. 266 Additionally,
trials increase acrimony which takes an emotional toll on the parties,
especially if one party is unrepresented. 267
Even for cases that were never going to go to trial, the new law will
be beneficial because low-income recipients can rarely afford any
litigation costs. 268 Litigation costs include both the extensive time and
energy required to get through the court process as well as the monetary
costs of attorneys and filing fees.269 Many pro se women must also bear
the costs of transportation and lost wages for the many court

260. See Olup, supra note 1511; see also Ward Farnsworth, The Economics of Enmity,
69 U. CHI. L. REV. 211, 219 (2002).
261. See Vuotto, Jr., supra note 150, at 8 (acknowledging that a number of states,
including Massachusetts, have struggled with disparate practices regarding alimony awards
and have consequently impeded parties ability to settle); Thurman, supra note 150, at 972.
262. Michael F. Leary, Massachusetts Alimony Reform: A Long Awaited and Welcomed
Change, AS THE LAW TURNS (Sept. 22, 2011), http://www.asthelawturns.com/2011/09/massa
chusetts-alimony-reform/.
263. See generally Hylton, supra note 1299; see also Ward Farnsworth, The Economics
of Enmity, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 211, 219 (2002).
264. Id.
265. See Leary, supra note 262.
266. See Olup, supra note 1511.
267. See id.
268. See id.
269. Id. at 13.
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appearances required by the litigation.270 When litigating a case, the
parties need to conduct discovery of the opposing party’s finances as
well as collect data on their own finances, which they could avoid if the
parties were able to settle on the issue of alimony. 271 These additional
discovery costs would be borne by the litigant. 272 The time required for
court appearances also poses substantial child care problems for lowincome custodial parents who likely cannot afford to pay someone to
supervise the children while they are in court. 273 Any circumvention of
the costs and burdens associated with litigation is sure to benefit lowincome women financially. 274
CONCLUSION
The Alimony Reform Act of 2011 changed the landscape of
domestic relations practice in Massachusetts. 275 While alimony payors
were the most vocal advocates for reform, the Act strikes a balance
between their needs and those of the recipient spouses. 276 It cannot be
denied that current alimony recipients, who were in long-term marriages
with merged agreements, will suffer initially. Ultimately, however, the
Act will benefit prospective alimony recipients by providing clear
guidelines tempered by judicial discretion, and a new ability to obtain
alimony in short-term marriages. The Act’s introduction of short-term
alimony categories reflects the large number of couples divorcing after
short-term marriages in Massachusetts. 277 The Act also provides
opportunities for those lower-income spouses to seek alimony while
maintaining safeguards that protect them from some of the Act’s harsher
provisions.
By enacting the Alimony Reform Act, the Legislature reaffirmed
the importance of alimony and repudiated the argument that alimony is
archaic and unnecessary. 278 Instead, the Act demonstrates that alimony
270. See id. at 11.
271. See Penelope Eileen Bryan, The Coercion of Women in Divorce Settlement
Negotiations, 74 DENV. U.L. REV. 931, 932 (1997).
272. Id.
273. See Smock, supra note 799, at 248 (explaining that women are generally the
primary child caretakers after marriage and that children will more commonly reside with
mothers after a divorce than with their fathers).
274. See Olup, supra note 1511.
275. See Tuthill, supra note 120.
276. See Murphy supra note 23 at notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
277. See NUMBER, TIMING, AND DURATION OF MARRIAGES AND DIVORCES, supra
note 213.
278. “It is obvious that times have changed so drastically that Alimony is truly
draconian law that has served out it’s [sic] purpose.” Changing the System, ALIMONY
REFORM, http://www.alimonyreform.org/about2.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2014).
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continues to be a viable and equitable remedy in Massachusetts divorce
proceedings to ensure that the choices made by intact families do not
financially benefit one party to the other’s detriment in a subsequent
divorce. 279 Women can become self-sustaining through—not in spite
of—alimony. Therefore, on balance, the Alimony Reform Act of 2011
continues to make alimony an available remedy in a divorce and also
enlarges the pool of potential recipients, which benefit women as a
whole.

279. Ellman, supra note 21.

